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THE ICARUS SYNDROME: HOW CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES LOST THEIR
QUASI-IMMUNITY
Norbert J. Gaillard & Michael Waibel*
ABSTRACT
Subsequent to the 2007–2008 subprime crisis, the SEC and the US Senate
discovered that it was common practice for major credit rating agencies
(CRAs) to produce inflated and inaccurate structured finance ratings. A
host of explanations were posited on how this was able to happen from the
“issuer pays” model of CRAs and conflicts of interest to underscoring the
CRA’s regulatory license and their ensuing insulation from legal liability.
Historically, credit ratings were akin to opinions. However, when courts
started to consider structured finance ratings as commercial speech in the
2000s, CRAs became more vulnerable to litigation. This article studies the
evolution of the status and the liability regime of CRAs and further argues
that they lost their regulatory and judicial “quasi-immunity” over the last
decade.
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I. INTRODUCTION
FOLLOWING the subprime crisis of 2007–2008, the U.S. Securitiesand Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Permanent Subcommit-tee on Investigations (PSI) of the U.S. Senate investigated the
methodologies and practices of major credit rating agencies (CRAs).1
They established that CRAs had knowingly produced inflated and inaccu-
rate structured finance (SF) ratings to preserve their market shares and
their profits.2 Such findings paved the way for an unprecedented wave of
regulation and supervision of CRAs, not only in the United States, but
also in Europe.3
Economists and lawyers have identified three main reasons for why
CRAs overrated thousands of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and failed in their role as debt
1. Fitch Ratings (Fitch), Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), and Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) are the top three CRAs in the world.
2. See SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2008) [hereinafter SEC, SUMMARY
REPORT], https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7PLQ-3Y79]; SEC, REP. NO. 458, THE SEC’S ROLE REGARDING AND OVERSIGHT OF
NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS (NRSROS) (2009)
[hereinafter SEC, THE SEC’S ROLE], https://www.sec.gov/files/report458.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M8XW-S9NK]; see also Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Rating
Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing].
3. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank] (codified as amended in sections 12
and 15 U.S.C.); Council Regulation 1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1 (EC), amended by
Council Regulation 462/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 146) 1.
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market gatekeepers.4 First, some economists and lawyers regard the “is-
suer pays” model5 of CRAs as the main cause of inflated ratings.6 As a
growing percentage of CRA revenues came from rating lucrative SF
products7 underwritten by an oligopoly of investment banks,8 the rating
methodologies of CRAs became laxer and laxer.9 A second group identi-
fies conflicts of interest at the CRAs as the main culprit.10 A third group
underscores the regulatory license granted to CRAs by embedding rat-
ings in regulation and their insulation from legal liability.11
Although these three causes led CRAs to inflate their SF ratings, U.S.
and European legislators have only addressed the third thus far by re-
moving references to credit ratings in regulatory rules12 and introducing
civil liability regimes for CRAs.13 Yet importantly, the SEC has main-
4. Standard & Poor’s global SF annual default and near-default rate for investment-
grade bonds increased by a factor of 315 between 2006 and 2008, climbing from 0.02% to
6.31%. STANDARD & POOR’S, GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE DEFAULT AND TRANSITION
STUDY–1978-2008: CREDIT QUALITY OF GLOBAL STRUCTURED SECURITIES FELL
SHARPLY IN 2008 AMID CAPITAL MARKET TURMOIL (2009).
5. From the issuance of the first credit ratings in 1909 to the late 1960s, CRAs’ reve-
nues came from investors who purchased rating reports. This was the “investor pays”
model. Starting in 1968, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch charged bond issuers. This shift to the
“issuer pays” model enabled CRAs to become more and more profitable.
6. See Jerome Mathis et al., Rating the Raters: Are Reputation Concerns Powerful
Enough to Discipline Rating Agencies?, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 657 (2009); John C. Cof-
fee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231
(2011).
7. In the case of Moody’s, the percentage of the SF segment in global revenue in-
creased from 24.6% in 1997 to 39.4% in 2007. In the meantime, Moody’s revenue soared
434%. See MOODY’S CORP., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT (2008), http://www.annualreports.com/
HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/m/NYSE_MCO_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SXT-
4W88]; MOODY’S CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT (2001), http://www.annualreports.com/
HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/m/NYSE_MCO_2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NY2-
Y834].
8. In 2007, twelve financial firms accounted for more than 80% of the market for
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) underwriters. Coffee, supra note 6, at 238.
9. For example, the poorer quality of the SF deals issued between 2006 and 2008 was
documented by Efraim Benmelech and Jennifer Dlugosz. See Efraim Benmelech & Jen-
nifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating Crisis, 24 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 161, 161–62
(2010).
10. See Norbert J. Gaillard & William J. Harrington, Efficient, Commonsense Actions
to Foster Accurate Credit Ratings, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 38, 45 (2016); see also Gretchen
Morgenson, The Stone Unturned: Credit Ratings, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2014), https://www
.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/business/the-stone-unturned-credit-ratings.html.
11. See Caleb Deats, Talk That Isn’t Cheap: Does the First Amendment Protect Credit
Rating Agencies’ Faulty Methodologies from Regulation?, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1818,
1822–23 (2010); Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit-Rating Agencies: An Insti-
tutional Investor Perspective, 25 J. INT’L BANKING AND FIN. L. 188 (2010). For a seminal
analysis on the risks of regulatory dependence on credit ratings, see Frank Partnoy, The
Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RICHARD M. LEVICH ET AL., RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES
AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 70–73 (Kluwer Acad. Publishers 2002).
12. Dodd–Frank, tit. IX, § 939 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1889 (2010); Council
Regulation 1060/2009, art. 5, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1, 11 (EC).
13. Dodd–Frank, tit. IX, §§ 933, 939 (nullifying SEC Rule 436(g), which exempted
CRAs’ ratings from being considered part of a registration statement prepared or certified
by an expert). For the European Union, see Council Regulation 1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L
302) 1 (EC), amended by Council Regulation 462/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 146) 1. For the United
Kingdom, see Council Regulation 1637/2013, art. 35(a), 2013 O.J. (L 302) 1.
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tained the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NR-
SRO) designation and continued to supervise the activity of ten CRAs
that qualify for this status.14 Additionally, some major private investors
have continued to rely on ratings for their own internal rules.15
However, the most significant development—which is the focus of this
article—is that investors and regulators have increasingly brought law-
suits against CRAs, and U.S. courts have started to award damages. For
example, in 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied First Amendment protection to CRAs for ratings dissemi-
nated to a select group of investors.16 In 2013, the U.S. Department of
Justice sued S&P for more than $5 billion for “(a) mail fraud affecting
federally insured financial institutions; (b) wire fraud affecting federally
insured financial institutions; and (c) financial institution fraud.”17 S&P
and the Department of Justice settled this case in February 2015 for
$1.375 billion—an unprecedented sum for a CRA.
This article studies how the status and the liability regime of CRAs
evolved, arguing that CRAs lost their regulatory and judicial “quasi-im-
munity” over the last decade. Traditionally, these firms enjoyed a degree
of protection much higher than their predecessors, mercantile agencies.18
First, they were unlikely to be sued for violation of privacy because they
assessed the creditworthiness of firms and not individuals. Second, given
the opaqueness of the CRAs’ methodologies,19 negligence was difficult to
prove. Third, defamatory allegations were not “credibly” actionable after
the shift from the “investor pays” to the “issuer pays” model in the late
1960s-early 1970s.20 More fundamentally, CRAs were hardly threatened
by libel lawsuits because credit ratings were akin to opinions.21 Starting in
the 1990s, the emergence of SF products transformed certain rating activ-
ities into advisory services, which changed the nature of credit ratings.
Section II discusses the role of CRAs as gatekeepers of financial mar-
14. See infra Section II.B.2. on the concept of NRSRO.
15. Vanguard—one of the world’s largest investment companies—continues to trust
CRAs. The Vanguard Intermediate-Term Investment-Grade Fund states that it invests in a
variety of high-quality fixed-income securities, which it defines simply as “those rated the
equivalent of A3 or better by Moody’s, or another independent rating agency.” VAN-
GUARD, VANGUARD INTERMEDIATE-TERM INVESTMENT-GRADE FUND SUMMARY PRO-
SPECTUS 2 (May 27, 2015), https://www.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/sp71.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7VU9-AY76].
16. See Abu Dhabi Comm. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155,
175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
17. Complaint at 1, United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. CV 13-00779
DOC(JCGx), 2013 WL 3762259 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2013).
18. Mercantile agencies were the first firms that assessed the creditworthiness of indi-
viduals and merchants. See infra Section II.B.
19. See Hearing, supra note 2, at 1097.
20. Once debt issuers accepted to pay fees in order to get a rating, they most fre-
quently participated in the rating process.
21. The terms and conditions included in the contracts signed with debt issuers and the
subscription terms of use recall that credit ratings are statements of opinion of the relative
future credit risk of borrowers and debts and not statements of current or historical fact as
to creditworthiness, investment or financial advice, recommendations regarding credit deci-
sions or decisions to purchase, hold or sell any securities.
2018] The Icarus Syndrome 1081
kets,22 and sheds new light on the regulatory license that the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the SEC granted them by em-
bedding ratings into regulatory rules and the creation of the NRSRO sta-
tus. Section III shows that the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment has traditionally shielded CRAs from litigation. CRAs have
even been immune to claims brought under Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, which provides for liability for material misstatements and
omissions in public offering documents. Section IV argues that the chang-
ing character of ratings has eroded the First Amendment protection on
which CRAs have traditionally relied. When courts instead started to
consider these ratings (especially SF ratings) as commercial speech, they
made CRAs more vulnerable to litigation. Section V shows that the sub-
prime crisis of 2007–2008 catalyzed this shift from quasi-immunity to lia-
bility, as claims by investors and regulators against CRAs for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation fell within the scope of commercial speech.
In this context, CRAs had little choice but to reach settlements and pay
substantial fines. Section VI concludes.
II. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AS GATEKEEPERS
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
Credit ratings emerged in the first quarter of the twentieth century.
They were considered simple and useful tools to assess the creditworthi-
ness of debt issuers. The expansion of capital markets and financial inno-
vation made CRAs increasingly powerful and profitable, particularly
from the 1980s onward. They acquired the status of de facto regulators.
The growing reliance of investors on credit ratings convinced regulators
to incorporate them into regulatory rules, a trend which already started in
the 1930s. The reliance on CRAs intensified until policymakers abruptly
changed course after the 2007–2008 subprime crisis, when the view
gained ground that CRAs had been one of the main causes of the crisis.
A. THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
The first ratings appeared in 1909 in Moody’s Analyses of Railroad In-
vestments manuals.23 These credit risk indicators emerged at a very op-
portune time. Several factors boosted the demand for rating manuals. As
the U.S. corporate bond market boomed,24 investors used credit ratings
as helpful tools to discriminate between good and bad securities. The first
22. We adopt Professor Coffee’s definition of the gatekeeper, i.e., “an agent who acts
as a reputational intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the ‘signal’ sent by
the corporate issuer.” JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2006).
23. GILBERT HAROLD, BOND RATINGS AS AN INVESTMENT GUIDE, AN APPRAISAL OF
THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 12 (1938).
24. The par amount of outstanding issues soared 112% between 1900 and 1908. This
percentage dwarfs that for 1920–1928 (+46% only). Authors’ computations are based on
W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN & ELIZABETH T. SIMPSON, STATISTICAL MEASURES OF CORPO-
RATE BOND FINANCING SINCE 1900 37 (1960).
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blue sky law—aimed at regulating the offering and sale of securities to
protect the public from fraud—was enacted in 1911.25 In the meantime,
growing U.S. savings looked for investment opportunities. Measures such
as the development of “baby bonds”26 encouraged even more households
to purchase securities.
Moody’s did not have any competitor until 1916, when Poor’s issued its
first corporate ratings. Standard Statistics and Fitch joined the rating busi-
ness in 1922 and 1924, respectively.27 During the interwar years, no other
major firm entered the business and thus, these four CRAs dominated
the market for credit ratings.28 That said, although they did not issue rat-
ings, several other firms that compiled financial data also competed with
Fitch, Moody’s, Poor’s, and Standard Statistics. For instance, A.M. Best
launched its Best’s Insurance Reports in 1900, but did not issue ratings
until 1928.29 Another example is the short-lived Winkler’s Manual of For-
eign Corporations, published in 1928 by Max Winkler, who had just left
Moody’s, but previously oversaw sovereign and municipal ratings.30 Thus,
from the beginning, the credit rating business had an oligopolistic charac-
ter. In 1941, the industry became more concentrated when Poor’s and
Standard Statistics merged to form Standard & Poor’s. The structure of
the credit rating industry has not substantially evolved since then.
At the end of 2016, the three main CRAs, Fitch,31 Moody’s,32 and
S&P,33 accounted for 96% of the world market for credit ratings.34 Fitch
accounted for just over 300,000 ratings, Moody’s for 780,000, and S&P for
nearly 1.12 million ratings.35 The profitability of the three main CRAs has
been high for many years: their 2016 operating margins reached 45%,
18%, and 50%, respectively.36 There are three principal reasons for
25. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 347, 352–64 (1991).
26. These baby bonds “allowed all Americans the opportunity to invest even small
amounts of money in a government-backed security.” Peter Tufano & Daniel Schneider,
Reinventing Savings Bonds 11 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 06-017, 2005), https:/
/www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/06-017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN5G-ELCX].
27. Marc Flandreau et al., To err is human: US rating agencies and the interwar foreign
government debt crisis, 15 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 495, 506–08 (2011).
28. HAROLD, supra note 23.
29. Chronology of Events, A.M. BEST, http://www.ambest.com/about/ambchronology
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LPZ-P7LT] (last visited Aug. 4, 2018).
30. NORBERT GAILLARD, A CENTURY OF SOVEREIGN RATINGS 32 (2011).
31. Fitch merged with IBCA in 1997 to form Fitch IBCA. Since the purchase of Duff
& Phelps and Thomson Financial BankWatch in 2000, the firm has operated as Fitch Rat-
ings. Fimalac and Hearst own Fitch. See NORBERT GAILLARD, LES AGENCES DE NOTA-
TION 9–10 (2010).
32. Moody’s is a company traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
33. S&P is a subsidiary of McGraw Hill Financial.
34. Authors’ calculations are based on the SEC. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATION-




36. FIMALAC, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2017), http://www.fimalac.com/items/files/f5ecf3
7beb048fc109c9b760808cb432_FIMALAC—Rapport-annuel—-exercice-2016-english-ver
sion.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N4E-TL8P]; MOODY’S CORP., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2017),
2018] The Icarus Syndrome 1083
CRA’s commercial success.
The first reason is the growth of bond markets. The sovereign rating
business illustrates how growing sovereign bond markets around the
world provided CRAs with more governments to rate. CRAs first as-
signed sovereign ratings in 1918, when many states had issued securities
to finance World War I. With the advent of the Great Depression and
World War II, sovereign debt markets dried up and the number of rated
foreign government bonds plummeted from one hundred twenty in 1929
to sixty-four in 1940.37 Sovereign ratings did not resume in earnest until
the financial globalization of the 1980s–1990s took hold.38
The second reason is the growing reliance of U.S. (and international)39
investors on ratings.40 They started embedding credit ratings into their
investment rules as early as the 1920s.41 The incorporation of ratings into
investment rules has become standard practice among U.S. and interna-
tional investors. Such investment rules include setting maximum portfolio
shares by rating category, maximum single-security exposure by rating
category, minimum requirements for bond purchases, retention guide-
lines for downgraded securities that no longer meet eligibility guidelines,
performance benchmarking relative to ratings-based bond indices, and/or
underpinning discussions between fund managers and clients,42 forecast-
ers43 and U.S. courts.44 Others have also used the research output of ma-
http://s21.q4cdn.com/431035000/files/doc_financials/annual/2016/2016-Annual-Report-vFI
NAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSG2-KPU6]; S&P GLOBAL, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2017),
http://investor.spglobal.com/Cache/1500096882.pdf?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=150009
6882&iid=4023623 [https://perma.cc/AM8A-T6WS]. The lower profitability posted by
Moody’s reflects an $864 million charge pursuant to a settlement agreement with the U.S.
Department of Justice and the attorneys general of twenty-one U.S. states and the District
of Columbia. See infra Section IV.B.
37. GAILLARD, supra note 30, at 4–5. These figures only include USD and GBP sover-
eign bonds listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
38. See id. at 8–10; see also Norbert Gaillard, What Is the Value of Sovereign Ratings?,
15 GERMAN ECON. REV. 208, 209 (2014).
39. Financial globalization starting in the 1980s increased the reliance by investors on
credit ratings in the United States and spread to many other countries. See TIMOTHY J.
SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING AGENCIES AND
THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS (2005); BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
STOCKTAKING ON THE USE OF CREDIT RATINGS 1–119 (2009) [hereinafter BIS], https://
www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAX2-2JY5].
40. The reputation of CRAs depends on the quality of the ratings they assign. See
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 628–36 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002).
41. LELAND REX ROBINSON, INVESTMENT TRUST ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
557–58 (1929). It took a decade for regulators to emulate investors’ reliance on ratings by
embedding them in regulatory rules. However, this embedding in regulatory rules proved
durable, and regulators only rolled it back from 2010 onwards.
42. Richard Cantor et al., The Use of Credit Ratings in Investment Management in the
U.S. and Europe, 17 J. FIXED INCOME 13, 15 (2007).
43. Moody’s and Standard Statistics surveys were particularly popular as early as the
1920s. See generally GARFIELD V. COX, AN APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN BUSINESS FORE-
CASTS (1929).
44. The number of references to Moody’s, Poor’s, and Standard Statistics reports in
U.S. court decisions grew strongly from the 1910s. See Marc Flandreau & Joanna Kinga
1084 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
jor CRAs in U.S. court cases.
Third, the shift in the business model of CRAs towards the issuer-pays
model in the late 1960s boosted their profits. Until then, revenues came
from investors who purchased rating reports. In 1968, after a controversy
with the city of New York, S&P decided to charge bond issuers for “the
cost of supporting the staff required to perform rating functions.”45
Moody’s followed suit in 197046 and the revenues and profits of both
companies soared within a few years.47 During the following decades,
CRAs developed annual fee arrangements48 and charged increasingly
higher fees49 to captive bond issuers who were legally bound to obtain a
rating.50
B. CREDIT RATINGS AND REGULATORY RULES
The three characteristics of a CRA are (i) the public accessibility and
widespread dissemination of its ratings, (ii) its evaluation of the issuer’s
credit risk based on models of some kind, and (iii) the payment of a fee
by the issuer or market participants to the CRA. Credit ratings are visible
for the market and the public at large—even if one has to pay a reasona-
ble fee to the CRA to obtain the underlying rating report.51 U.S. law
defines a CRA as any person
(A) engaged in the business of issuing credit ratings on the Internet
or through another readily accessible means, for free or for a reason-
able fee, but does not include a commercial credit reporting
company;
Sławatyniec, Understanding rating addiction: US courts and the origins of rating agencies’
regulatory license (1900–1940), 20 FIN. HIST. REV. 237, 241–43 (2013).
45. Brenton W. Harries, Standard & Poor’s Corporation New Policy on Rating Munic-
ipal Bonds, 24 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 68, 68–71 (1968).
46. See generally Moody’s to Charge for Corporate Ratings, But Rival Standard &
Poor’s to Hold Off, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1970.
47. See generally Michael L. Geczi, The Rating Game, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1976.
Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway Corporation bought Moody’s stock in 2000, and has
held more than twelve million of Moody’s outstanding stock ever since. See Reports, BERK-
SHIRE HATHAWAY, http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/reports.html, [https://perma.cc/
5BGA-VBUC] (last visited Aug. 4, 2018).
48. Nonexistent in 1989, these relationship-based fees accounted for 36% of Moody’s
total revenue in 2000. MOODY’S CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2001). These ancillary
business operations contributed to change the nature of the speech delivered by CRAs. See
infra Section III.A. According to the SEC, they still present potential conflicts of interest.
See SEC, REPORT TO CONGRESS: CREDIT RATING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE STUDY 18
(2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/credit-rating-agency-independence-study-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4FN-DH42].
49. For example, fees charged for structured finance deals represented twelve basis
points (bps) in 2007 compared to 4–5 bps in 1995. Richard House, Ratings Trouble, 29
INSTITUTIONAL INV. 245, 245–49 (Oct. 1995). Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, CDO
Boom Masks Subprime Losses, Abetted by S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, BLOOMBERG (May 31,
2007), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2007-05-31/cdo-boom-masks-subprime-
losses-abetted-by-sp-moodys-fitch [https://perma.cc/6QGJ-J3FA].
50. BIS, supra note 39, at 29–118. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at 74–75.
51. Notably, the commercial credit reporting companies examined in the next section
are not CRAs because they do not assign publicly available ratings to issuers, but rather
evaluate the creditworthiness of a debtor for a more limited set of recipients.
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(B) employing either a quantitative or qualitative model, or both, to
determine credit ratings; and
(C) receiving fees from either issuers, investors, or other market
participants, or a combination thereof.52
The first sub-section considers the origins of CRAs as well as their pre-
cursors, “mercantile agencies,” and discusses their emergence as de facto
regulatory bodies for capital markets. The second sub-section considers
how the increasing reference in regulatory rules to credit ratings ce-
mented their status as market gatekeepers and further amplified the use
of ratings by U.S. and international investors. The third sub-section docu-
ments how the subprime crisis led to a new paradigm, which convinced
U.S. regulators to remove references to credit ratings from regulatory
rules.
1. The Origins of the Mercantile and Credit Rating Agencies and the
Transformation of CRAs into De Facto Regulatory Bodies
As we saw in the previous sub-section, credit rating agencies are a
twentieth century phenomenon. Their precursors in the nineteenth cen-
tury were the so-called mercantile agencies. In 1841, Lewis Tappan
formed “The Mercantile Agency,” the first credit reporting agency. In
1849, John Bradstreet, his competitor, established the “Bradstreet
Agency.”53 Credit reporting agencies (or mercantile agencies) provided
reports on the credit standing of individuals and enterprises, whereas
CRAs focus on assessing the creditworthiness of bond issuers. While
banks and other businesses relied on credit reporting agencies to judge
whether they should extend credit, or enter into another type of transac-
tion, the focus of CRAs has historically been on providing an indepen-
dent assessment of issuers on the (public) debt markets for the benefit of
a dispersed and numerous potential bondholders.54
Both mercantile agencies and CRAs feature the term “agency” in their
name. The founders of mercantile agencies did not choose the name
“agency” to mimic administrative agencies established by Congress.55
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(61) (2012).
53. James H. Madison, The Evolution of Commercial Credit Reporting Agencies in
Nineteenth-Century America, 48 BUS. HIST. REV. 164, 168 (1974).
54. As we show below, ratings of SF products—a key activity of CRAs in the 1990s
and 2000s—were not for the benefit of numerous—a factor that led the court post-2010 to
qualify them as “commercial speech” rather than as “political speech” benefitting from
plenary First Amendment protection.
55. Plainly, neither is an administrative agency, in the formal sense. In U.S. adminis-
trative law, an administrative agency is an independent sub-branch of government set up
by a legislature to implement laws. Agencies require an enabling act by Congress or a state
legislature. Congress, or a state legislature, creates the agency and vests it with specific
powers. Administrative Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (“A governmen-
tal body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation. The term
‘agency’ includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration,
authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United
States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to
be used in a more limited sense.”).
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Lewis Tappan may have envisaged a national agency with broad geo-
graphical coverage, and perhaps it fitted his image of the company to
name it accordingly. More likely, the term “agency” goes back to the or-
ganizational structure of credit reporting agencies. Subscribers to the
Mercantile Agency requested information about actual or potential fur-
nishers, clients, or debtors. Lewis Tappan’s business model relied on a
large network of correspondents or agents.56 These agents played a key
role in reporting on the creditworthiness of businesspersons and compa-
nies from across the United States. This is evident from the volumes of
handwritten credit reports of R.G. Dun & Company (the successor com-
pany to the Mercantile Agency);57 they contained not only personal, com-
mercial, and financial information on businesspersons, but also opinions
on their creditworthiness.
CRAs have been privately owned entities since their establishment in
the early twentieth century. Unlike Lewis Tappan’s company (which, as
we saw above, he called Mercantile Agency from its foundation), Fitch,
Moody’s, Poor’s, and Standard Statistics did not call themselves “agen-
cies” during the first two decades of their activities.58 Similarly, the
Comptroller of the Currency did not mention the concept of agency in
the two regulatory rules that incorporated credit ratings in 1931 and
1936.59 The OCC only cited the names of the major firms, whose ratings
investors could use, and referred simply to the “recognized rating
manuals.”60
In fact, the expressions “credit rating agency” and “rating agency” did
not begin to spread in banking61 and academic circles62 until the mid-
1930s. It coincided with the height of the New Deal and the birth of the
modern administrative state. It may have reflected the contemporaneous
opinion that CRAs had become de facto regulators. Morton aptly sum-
marized this view as follows:
The Banking Act of 1935 had in effect transferred the responsibility
for deciding upon the classes of securities to be purchased to govern-
mental agencies, which in turn have delegated it to private institu-
tions: Fitch, Moody, Poor, and Standard Statistics.63
56. In 1851, the Mercantile Agency depended on nearly 2,000 correspondents to pre-
pare reports. Madison, supra note 53, at 168.
57. R.G. DUN & CO., R.G. DUN & CO. CREDIT REPORTS COLLECTION (n.d.)
(archived with the Baker Library, Harvard Business School).
58. The four firms primarily emphasized their expertise in statistical and rating ser-
vices to investors. See GAILLARD, supra note 30, at 4–5.
59. See infra Section II.B.2.
60. Mimeographed Ruling by J. W. Pole, then Comptroller of the Currency (Aug. 29,
1931).
61. See Security Regulations Opposed by Bankers, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1936; HAR-
OLD, supra note 23, at 28.
62. See Raymond W. Coleman, Pledged Revenue as Security for Government Bonds,
26 AM. ECON. REV. 667, 670 (1936); Melchior Palyi, Bank Portfolios and the Control of the
Capital Market, 11 J. BUS. U. CHI. 70, 70–73 (1938); HAROLD, supra note 23, at 34; Walter
A. Morton, Liquidity and Solvency, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 272, 275 (1939).
63. Morton, supra note 62, at 277 (using the terms “private agencies” and “rating
agencies” interchangeably).
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The reference to S&P’s, Moody’s, and Fitch as credit rating agencies con-
tributed to giving ratings a quasi-regulatory imprimatur and facilitated
the widespread reliance on ratings by government agencies (such as the
SEC) and by investors.
2. The Incorporation of Credit Ratings in U.S. Rulemaking
As mentioned in the introduction, the reliance on credit ratings takes
two forms. First, private investors rely on ratings through their own inter-
nal rules. Historically, this type of reliance began in the 1920s, but contin-
ues to date. Second, public regulators incorporate ratings into regulatory
rules. This practice started in the 1930s and became entrenched from the
1980s onward. But regulators abruptly changed course in 2010, and for
the most part removed references to ratings from their regulatory rules.
This section focuses on the second type of reliance.
Ratings became more central to decisions of investors in part through
rulemaking by U.S. regulators that referred to ratings. In 1931, the OCC
enacted the very first rule that incorporated ratings.64 Issued at a time
when the U.S. bond market was bearish, this rule indicated that banks
had to value their portfolios as follows: they were obliged to report U.S.
government and municipal bonds as well as other domestic and foreign
securities assigned the four highest ratings (Aaa/AAA, Aa/AA, A/A and
Baa/BBB) at face value. In contrast, domestic and foreign securities were
rated Ba/BB and below at market value. According to the OCC, the ra-
tionale for this rule was that high-grade bonds might otherwise be un-
fairly depreciated.65 In fact, the rule only institutionalized an already
widespread practice among U.S. banks.66 As early as 1930, the OCC had
allowed banks to enter high-grade bonds in their books at face value so
that they could carry higher cash reserves.67
In 1936, the OCC enacted a second rule that referred to credit rat-
ings.68 The Comptroller of the Currency established that U.S. banks
could hold only securities rated in the top four rating categories. U.S.
government and municipal bonds were outside the ambit of the rule.69
This new rule applied to prohibit holdings of “speculative” grade and de-
faulting bonds. However, the OCC refused to define the term “specula-
64. Mimeographed Ruling by J. W. Pole, Comptroller of the Currency (Aug. 29, 1931).
65. See 75% of Bank Bond Valuations Safe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1931.
66. See Bond Fluctuations Ignored by Banks, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1931.
67. Gustav Osterhus, Flaw-Tester for Bond Lists, 29 AM. BANKERS ASS’N J. 67, 67–68
(1931); see also Pierre Penet, Calculating and Governing Risk in Times of Crisis: The Role
of Credit Ratings in Regulatory Reasoning and Legal Change, 84 ENTERPRISES ET HISTOIRE
162, 162–63 (2016).
68. See New Set of Rules Further Limits Bank Investments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1936.
69. The rationale for this decision may be that regulators considered these domestic
securities to be safe. In 1929, all CRAs assigned U.S. government bonds the highest rating,
while 95% of U.S. state and local governments were ranked in the top three rating catego-
ries. The U.S. government did not default during the Great Depression, but 264 state and
local government securities defaulted, and 87% of them were rated A or higher by
Moody’s in 1929. See GAILLARD, supra note 30, at 39; GEORGE H. HEMPEL, THE POSTWAR
QUALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL DEBT 108–109 (1971).
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tive”70 and even mitigated the initial rule, admitting that banks could
purchase speculative bonds if they could prove that the risk of default of
such securities was low.71 This decision to mitigate the rule was linked to
lobbying by banks. According to them, these “private rating agencies”
had inadequate staff to devote sufficient time to research, with the result
that the banks’ own ratings differed from those of the agencies. Bankers
also considered that the delegation to these firms of the judgment as to
what constitutes a sound investment was not warranted by their ability to
anticipate crises.72
After World War II, the United States made further rules on ratings.
For instance, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) imposed higher capital requirements on insurers’ lower-rated
bonds in 1951.73 The SEC “imposed higher capital haircuts on broker/
dealers’” speculative-grade securities (Rule 15c3-1) and eased disclosure
requirements for investment-grade bonds in 1975 and 1982,
respectively.74
With the advent of financial globalization in the 1980s, getting a credit
rating became crucial for debt issuers willing to access capital markets
and borrow from investment funds, which had no internal credit risk as-
sessment comparable to those that banks used. This led to a surge in the
number of ratings-based regulations worldwide and boosted the credit
rating business. In the United States, securities references to NRSROs
increased tenfold between 1980 and 2000.75 Reliance on credit ratings in-
tensified with the Basel II Accord, which was reached in 2004 and imple-
mented in the following years.76 The Basel II Accord was a set of rules on
banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision. They established that, under the so-called “standard ap-
proach,” the calculation of minimum capital requirements was contingent
upon the ratings assigned to the entities a bank had claims on. The higher
the rating, the lower the capital requirement. For example, banks could
70. See Comptroller Unlikely to Officially Define “Speculative” Securities, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 29, 1936. Since then, the speculative grade category has included bonds and issuers
rated in the Ba/BB letter category and below.
71. See Banks Given More Discretion in Investments, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1936.
72. Security Regulations Opposed by Bankers, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1936. Recent re-
search on the interwar sovereign bond market partly supports the bankers’ assertion. See
Flandreau supra note 27, at 497.
73. The NAIC is the standard-setter for the insurance industry, and the insurance reg-
ulators of U.S. states and territories are its members. It is organized as a private, charitable,
non-profit organization headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri. With its 1951 decision, the
NAIC began equating the term “investment grade bonds” with bonds having ratings of
BBB/Baa or better. THOMAS R. ATKINSON, TRENDS IN CORPORATE BOND QUALITY 53–54
(1967).
74. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, 19 FED. RES. BANK
N.Y. Q. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
75. Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, supra note 11, at 76–77.
76. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards—A Revised Framework, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS 1, 5 (Nov. 2005), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7B4B-4PT7].
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apply a twenty percent risk weight to claims on corporate issuers rated
between AAA and AA–. The required risk weight rose to fifty percent
for corporate debt rated in the A+/A– categories, and so on. The exten-
sive use of credit ratings by regulators is part of a larger trend of “govern-
ance by indicators.”77 Limited literature considers ratings an instrument
of (private) global governance.78
At this stage, the concept of NRSRO and liability exemptions for
CRAs require further analysis. Delegated monitoring started with the in-
corporation of references to ratings into regulatory rules. From the 1970s
onward, the NRSRO designation magnified this trend. The SEC came up
with the concept of NRSRO in 1975 to designate the CRAs, whose rat-
ings could be used for regulatory purposes.79 The designation as NRSRO
has been important since then because it has been a de facto prerequisite
for the market to deem a CRA to be reliable.80 The NRSRO label gave
select CRAs (i.e., Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P) greater market power by
establishing barriers to entry and led to increased reliance on credit rat-
ings in regulations. More insidiously, the creation of the NRSRO designa-
tion contributed to inflate the ratings of U.S. corporate issuers in the
second half of the 1970s. Because CRAs had a guaranteed client base,
they searched for new clients and inflated their ratings by approximately
one full rating category.81
The regulatory reliance on NRSRO ratings gave CRAs an entrenched
role in the governance of U.S. financial markets,82 at least until the enact-
ment of the Dodd–Frank Act in 2010. The SEC initially abstained from
defining the term “NRSRO,” but in 2005, it clarified that it considered
the following factors in this assessment: the CRA’s organizational struc-
ture; its financial resources; the size and the quality of its staff; its inde-
pendence from the companies it rated; its rating procedures; and the
existence of internal procedures to prevent the misuse of nonpublic infor-
77. See Kevin E. Davis et al., Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 71, 80–83 (2012) (briefly discussing credit rating agencies); Mauro Bussani,
Credit Rating Agencies’ Accountability: Short Notes on a Global Issue, 10 GLOB. JURIST 1, 2
(2010); Harry McVea, Credit Rating Agencies, the Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Global
Governance: The EU Strikes Back, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 701, 703–04 (2010); EYAL
BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 92 (2014).
78. See A. CLAIRE CUTLER ET AL., PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AF-
FAIRS 10 (A.C. Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter eds., 1999); see also ANDREAS
KRUCK, PRIVATE RATINGS, PUBLIC REGULATIONS: CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND
GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE (2011); Bruce G. Carruthers, Credit Ratings and Global
Economic Governance: Non Price Valuation in Financial Markets, in CONTRACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION IN GLOBAL MARKETS
(Gre´goire Mallard and Je´roˆme Sgard eds., 2016).
79. Considering the growing reliance on credit ratings, the designation NRSRO had
strategic and financial value for CRAs. See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 55 (2004).
80. Since 2006, the SEC has also exercised extensive oversight over NRSROs.
81. Patrick Behr et al., Did Government Regulations Lead to Inflated Credit Ratings?,
64 MGMT. SCI. 1034, 1035 (2018).
82. When ratings became increasingly common in other countries from the 1980s on-
wards, they often imported U.S.-style regulatory reliance on ratings as well.
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mation and the compliance with these procedures.83 Specifically, NRSRO
means a credit rating agency that:
(A) issues credit ratings certified by qualified institutional buyers, in
accordance with section 78o–7(a)(1)(B)(ix) of this title, with respect
to:
(i) financial institutions, brokers, or dealers;
(ii) insurance companies;
(iii) corporate issuers;
(iv) issuers of asset-backed securities (as that term is defined in
section 1101(c) of part 229 of title 17, Code of Federal Regula-
tions, as in effect on September 29, 2006);
(v) issuers of government securities, municipal securities, or se-
curities issued by a foreign government; or
(vi) a combination of one or more of the categories of obligors
described in any of clauses (i) through (v); and
(B) is registered under section 780-7 of this title.84
In 1975, the SEC granted NRSRO status to only three CRAs: Fitch,
Moody’s, and S&P—the same three CRAs that continue to dominate the
market for ratings. Only four CRAs obtained membership of this “exclu-
sive club” between 1975 and 1991: Duff & Phelps in 1982, Mac Carthy,
Crisanti & Maffei in 1983, IBCA in 1990, and Thomson BankWatch in
1991. Yet, the “big three” CRAs acquired each of these four CRAs in the
1990s.85 Thus, Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P were again the only NRSROs in
2000. Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) obtained the NRSRO des-
ignation in 2003, as did A.M. Best in 2005.86
Following the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006,87 the number
of NRSROs increased further. At the end of 2017, there were ten NR-
SROs: A.M. Best, DBRS, Egan-Jones, Fitch, HR Ratings de Me´xico, Ja-
pan Credit Rating Agency, Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Moody’s,
Morningstar, and S&P.88 However, the big three have continued to domi-
nate the market. Since the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
came into force, the SEC has exercised regulatory oversight over these
NRSROs.
83. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-8570, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 (proposed Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(62) (2012). The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 in-
serted this definition.
85. GAILLARD, supra note 31, at 96.
86. Id.
87. The objective of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was to “improve
rating quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering account-
ability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry.” Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012)).
88. SEC, supra note 34, at 2.
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In the late 1970s, in order to permit the disclosure of ratings in docu-
ments filed with the SEC, the Commission contemplated whether NR-
SROs should be required to provide consent under § 7 of the Securities
Act of 1933, thereby subjecting them to liability under § 11.89 NRSROs
were not prepared to provide such consent if they were named in regis-
tration statements. In 1982, this refusal by the CRAs prompted the SEC
to adopt Rule 436(g). Responding to concerns of the NRSROs, the new
rule modified who was to be considered part of the registration statement
prepared or certified by a person falling within the ambit of § 7 and § 11
of the Securities Act. It established that a security rating that an NRSRO
assigned to a debt security was not part of the statement.
The SEC justified Rule 436(g) by reference to the existing liability of
CRAs under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and
regulation by the Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.90 However, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
amended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to exclude NRSROs from
the category of “investment adviser” to which they belonged so far.91
3. Greater Supervision of Rating Agencies and Removal of Statutory
References to Ratings
In 2008 and 2009, the SEC identified flaws in CRAs’ models and prac-
tices that had produced inaccurate SF ratings, which contributed signifi-
cantly to the U.S. subprime crisis.92 In 2010, the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the U.S. Senate released a long
memorandum that explained how and why CRAs had failed in their role
as financial market gatekeepers.93
The incriminating evidence was impressive. From 2004 to 2007,
Moody’s and S&P neglected credit risks related to mortgage fraud and
the housing price bubble. They also used inaccurate models to rate
RMBS and CDOs. Once they realized their mistakes in 2006, they revised
their models, but failed to use them to re-evaluate existing RMBS and
CDO, delaying thousands of downgrades. Consequently, when the sub-
89. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 18,524,
1982 WL 90376 (Mar. 19, 1982). A security may be registered with the SEC by filing a
registration statement. Section 7 of the Securities Act of 1933 originally established that “if
any accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a
statement made by him, is named as having prepared or certified any part of the registra-
tion statement, or is named as having prepared or certified a report or valuation for use in
connection with the registration statement, the written consent of such person shall be filed
with the registration statement.” Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74
(1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012)).
90. Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the Securities Act
of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9071, 96 SEC Docket 2719 (Oct. 7, 2009).
91. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 defines investment adviser as any person or
group that makes investment recommendations or conducts securities analysis in return for
a fee, whether through direct management of client assets or via written publications. In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(F) (2012).
92. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 2; SEC, THE SEC’S ROLE, supra note 2.
93. Hearing, supra note 2.
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prime crisis amplified in July 2007, Moody’s and S&P announced massive
downgrades that shocked financial markets. They also inflated their
credit ratings to preserve their market shares, particularly in the SF
area.94 The two main CRAs did not have sufficient resources and analysts
to assign accurate ratings.95
The SEC and PSI findings were a milestone in the enactment of Title
IX, Subtitle C (Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agen-
cies) of the Dodd-Frank Act of July 2010.96 A first set of Dodd–Frank
provisions focuses on credit rating methodologies. It requires that NR-
SROs develop internal control structure,97 use qualitative and quantita-
tive data and models, consistently apply methodologies across ratings,98
and ensure that CRAs assess default probabilities.99 NRSROs must en-
hance transparency by publishing the evolutions of all ratings that facili-
tate comparisons across issuers, sectors, NRSROs, and time.100
In addition, Congress established the Office of Credit Ratings and gave
it broad discretion in rulemaking and oversight to ensure that ratings are
not “unduly influenced by conflict of interest.”101 Other provisions aimed
at preventing NRSRO employees from corrupting rating processes.102
Prior to the Dodd-Frank provisions, CRAs had no legal or regulatory
obligation to fight conflicts of interest. Moreover, Congress nullified Rule
436(g)103 and amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to hold
CRAs accountable for their statements in the same manner and to the
same extent as public accounting firms under securities law.104 Lastly,
Congress removed all references to credit ratings from federal regula-
tions105 and required federal agencies to establish new uniform standards
of creditworthiness.106 Cutting overreliance on credit ratings is compli-
cated by the difficulty of finding robust substitutes.
The SEC issued various amendments to implement § 939A of the
Dodd-Frank Act. For instance, the SEC amended Forms N-1A, N-2, and
94. Gaillard & Harrington, supra note 10, at 39.
95. Hearing, supra note 2, at 24–25. These findings are in line with Efraim Benmelech
and Jennifer Dlugosz. See Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 9.
96. For an overview of the Dodd–Frank Act and its capacity to prevent future finan-
cial crises, see Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd–Frank Prevent Future Cri-
ses?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243 (2011).
97. See Dodd–Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(a)(3), 124 Stat 1376 (2010) (codified
as amended in sections 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
98. Id. § 932(r) (Credit Ratings Methodologies).
99. Id. § 938 (Universal Ratings Symbols).
100. Id. § 932(q) (Transparency of Ratings Performance).
101. Id. § 932(p)(1) (Regulation of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organiza-
tions—Establishment of Office of Credit Ratings).
102. Id. § 932(a)(3) (Separation of Ratings from Sales and Marketing); Id. § 932(a)(4)
(Look-Back Requirement); id. § 932(a)(5) (Report to Commission on Certain Employ-
ment Transitions).
103. Id. § 939G (Effect of Rule 436(g)).
104. Id. § 933 (State of Mind in Private Actions).
105. Id. § 939 (Removal of Statutory References to Credit Ratings).
106. Id. § 939A (Review of Reliance on Ratings).
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N-3 as follows:107
To no longer require the use of NRSRO credit ratings by funds that
choose to use credit quality categorizations in the required table,
chart, or graph of portfolio holdings. Accordingly, funds that choose
to show credit quality categorizations in the required table, chart, or
graph may use alternative categorizations that are not based on NR-
SRO credit ratings. . . . Funds will also be required to describe how
the credit quality of the holdings was determined, and if credit rat-
ings are used, a description of how they were identified and
selected.108
The SEC also modified the broker–dealer net capital rule (Rule 15c3-1)
as follows:
When a broker-dealer applies haircuts for commercial paper, non-
convertible debt, and preferred stock that have a ready market for
purposes of its net capital computation, it will have the option of: (1)
using the firm’s own written policies and procedures to determine
whether the security has only a minimal amount credit risk and, if so,
applying the appropriate lower haircut if it meets the other condi-
tions prescribed in Rule 15c3-1; or (2) applying the greater deduction
applicable to the position, such as the 15% haircut under the catchall
provision in paragraph (c)(2)(vi)(J) of Rule 15c3-1. Commercial pa-
per, nonconvertible debt, and preferred stock without a ready mar-
ket would continue to be subject to a 100% haircut.109
The SEC amendments to Forms N-1A, N-2, and N-3 and to Rule 15c3-1
reduce mechanistical reliance on CRA ratings, as advocated by the Finan-
cial Stability Board (FSB).110 Though they encourage investors to de-
velop their own capacity for credit risk assessment and due diligence, the
two SEC amendments do not prevent them from using credit ratings.
The removal of regulatory references to credit ratings in 2010 ended a
long tradition among U.S. legislators and regulators.111 The incorporation
of credit ratings into regulatory rules had been a standard feature of the
U.S. regulatory landscape since the 1930s. In addition, as a result of the
financial globalization of the 1980s and 1990s, Moody’s and S&P’s be-
came de facto regulators, whose opinions and decisions sparked fear
107. Forms N-1A, N-2, and N-3 contain the requirements for shareholder reports of
mutual funds, closed-end funds, and certain insurance company separate accounts that of-
fer variable annuities.
108. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Investment Company
Act, Exchange Act Release No. 9506, 2013 WL 11309619, at *19–20 (Dec. 27, 2013).
109. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-71194, 107 SEC Docket 5717, at *14 (Dec. 27,
2013).
110. See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE ON
CRA RATINGS (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101027.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7PM6-8654]. The FSB is an international body that makes recommenda-
tions to enhance the global financial system.
111. This trend to no longer rely on ratings for regulatory purposes extends to other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Council Regulation (EU) 462/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 146) 1.
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among policymakers and in financial markets.112 One reason why ratings
became so entrenched in the regulatory and rule-making process may be
that the very name “credit rating agency” gave them a regulatory appear-
ance, in the eyes of Congress, the SEC, and the investing public. Given
that ratings appeared to be quasi-regulatory, their incorporation into reg-
ulatory rules seemed unproblematic for a long time.
We now turn to examining how litigation against mercantile agencies
and CRAs has evolved since the nineteenth century.
III. QUASI-IMMUNITY FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
This section considers the traditional position of CRAs and their pred-
ecessor, mercantile agencies, in litigation in U.S. courts. There are two
main potential plaintiffs against CRAs: investors that use ratings in their
decisions, and issuers adversely affected by (changes to) ratings. We first
consider defamation claims against mercantile agencies in the nineteenth
century. We then analyze how U.S. courts came to regard credit ratings as
constitutionally protected free speech under the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. The effect was that free speech became an almost im-
penetrable shield. CRAs enjoyed almost complete immunity in U.S.
courts in suits for liability based on erroneous ratings. The final sub-sec-
tion addresses securities litigation against CRAs.
CRAs enjoyed “quasi-immunity” as long as they assigned their ratings
in the interest of investors, and the courts considered them speech under
the First Amendment. However, once CRAs shifted their business model,
charged issuers for ratings, and assigned their ratings in the interest of
issuers (i.e., the investment banks that issued SF products, rather than
investors), their ratings and reports became commercial speech. We argue
that CRAs succumbed to the Icarus Syndrome.113 Their closer relations
with powerful investment banks that underwrote, issued, and traded SF
products damaged their credibility and lessened their capacity to be
shielded by the First Amendment from potential liability for erroneous
ratings. When CRAs increasingly assigned biased and inflated ratings
over the last decade, they became vulnerable to lawsuits and regulatory
enforcement.
A. DEFAMATION AS THE FOCUS OF EARLY LITIGATION
Defamation was the main challenge for mercantile agencies in the
nineteenth century, but not for CRAs for most of the twentieth century.
In the first legal actions based on the reports of mercantile agencies in the
second half of the nineteenth century, U.S. courts sought to define the
112. Recall what New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared in 1996:
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United States
and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping
bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not
clear sometimes who’s more powerful.” Partnoy, supra note 40, at 620.
113. GAILLARD, supra note 30, at 184–85.
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legal responsibilities of the agencies and of the businesspersons who used
them.
The key early case of Tappan v. Beardsley against the Mercantile
Agency resulted in $10,000 in damages for libel, a significant liability.114
Yet, then, a major change in the legal definition of “privileged communi-
cation” was set forth in Ormsby v. Douglass,115 challenging Beardsley’s
approach to liability for libel. There, a businessperson who believed that a
report was incorrect and unjust sued the Mercantile Agency. The Agency
argued that the reading of a report sent to a subscriber constituted a priv-
ileged communication, and therefore was not subject to the charge of
slander.116 However, the court disagreed.
State v. Morgan further considered the status of mercantile agencies.117
Dun sued on behalf of Morgan, one of its agents. South Dakota had fined
Morgan for failing to register in the state. The Supreme Court held that
mercantile agencies fell under both federal and state control, and could
be regulated by both. It rejected Dun’s argument that this amounted to
an interference with interstate commerce.
Another early libel case against a mercantile agency found its way to
the Privy Council in England. In Macintosh v. Dun,118 Macintosh sued
Dun based on a report indicating that Macintosh was an ill-reputed
trader. Having originated in the High Court of Australia, the issue on
which the Privy Council’s decision turned was whether the communica-
tion between Dun and its client was privileged. If so, the liability in libel
would be reduced. While the trial judge had found in favor of the plain-
tiff, the high court entered judgment for the defendant. The Privy Council
concluded that the information was not privileged, and Macintosh’s ac-
tion in libel was successful. The Privy Council reasoned that Dun was a
commercial enterprise.
The occasion was privileged if the communication injurious to the
plaintiffs’ character was made in the general interest of society and from
a sense of duty; not so, if it was made from motives of self-interest by
those who, for the convenience of a class, trade for profit in the charac-
ters of other persons, and who offer for sale information which, however
cautiously and discreetly sought, may have been improperly obtained.
“However convenient it may be to a trader to know all the secrets of his
neighbor’s position, his ‘standing,’ his ‘responsibility,’ and whatever else
may be comprehended under the expression ‘et cetera,’ yet, even so, accu-
racy of information may be bought too dearly—at least for the good of
114. Tappan v. Beardsley, 77 U.S. 427, 433 (1870). According to MeasuringWorth, this
amounts to $23 million in today’s money. On Tappan and the Mercantile Agency, see supra
Part II.B.1.
115. Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868).
116. Id. at 479–80; see also JOSEPH ERRANT, THE LAW RELATING TO MERCANTILE
AGENCIES, T. & J. W. JOHNSON & CO. 8 (1889). Cf. Minter v. Bradstreet Co., 73 S.W. 668,
668 (Mo. 1903) (another libel case against Bradstreet before it became Dun & Bradstreet).
117. State v. Morgan, 48 N.W. 314, 315 (S.D. 1891).
118. Macintosh v. Dun [1908] AC 390 (P.C. 1908) (Austl.).
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society in general.”119
U.S. courts later quoted this decision, with one trial judge stating that
“the company that goes into the business of selling news or reports about
others should assume the responsibility for its acts, and must be sure that
it is peddling the truth.”120 Academic criticism of this decision followed in
1914.121 Dun faced at least ninety-five libel lawsuits between 1880 and
1900, indicating that mercantile agencies operating during this period
faced considerable litigation.122
This contrasts with the few lawsuits against CRAs in the first half of the
twentieth century. We searched reported lawsuits involving one of today’s
major three CRAs, known by their current (Fitch, Moody’s, S&P) or for-
mer names (Poor’s and Standard Statistics). Most early cases did not in-
volve claims based on the liability of the rating agency for its rating.
Instead, the early cases involving a rating firm showed that the courts
relied on credit ratings to make their decisions.123 For instance, in an
early decision involving Poor’s, Henry W. Poor & Co. was sued in an
action to rescind a contract “of [a] sale to plaintiff [Lawson] upon the
ground of false representation made by the defendant Henry W. Poor . . .
which representations were the inducing cause to plaintiff of such
purchase.”124
Very early, U.S. courts started to give high credence to ratings as a
reliable source of information. For instance, In re Bartol concerned a
challenge of a trustee’s purchase of an electric railway bond, and referred
to Poor’s 1890 Manual in the following terms: “[i]t must be conceded
under the evidence, that the trustees used all the care that a person of
ordinary care and prudence would use in determining upon an invest-
ment of his personal funds.”125 In re Detre’s Estate confirmed that a trust
properly purchased certain bonds in reliance on a Moody’s rating. “In
Moody’s Manual for 1914, these . . . bonds are rated: Security, very high;
119. Id. Marc Flandreau and Gabriel Geisler Mesevage’s historical research identified
these early cases. See Marc Flandreau & Gabriel Geisler Mesevage, The Untold History of
Transparency: Mercantile Agencies, the Law, and the Lawyers (1851–1916), 15 ENTER. &
SOC’Y 213, 215 (2014) (arguing that rating agencies, as we know them today, developed out
of the early mercantile agencies not due to cultural demand for their services, but rather as
a result of business interest, in spite of the law).
120. Pac. Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 139 P. 1007, 1010 (Idaho 1914).
121. See Jeremiah Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies.—Macintosh v.
Dun, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 192 (1914) [hereinafter Dun I]; Jeremiah Smith, Conditional
Privilege for Mercantile Agencies.—Macintosh v. Dun II, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 296, 310
(1914) [hereinafter Dun II].
122. Flandreau & Mesevage, supra note 119, at 239.
123. For a survey of these early cases against CRAs, see FLANDREAU & SłAWATYNIEC,
FINANCIAL HISTORY REVIEW 257 (2013). Their appendix shows that most cases referring
to rating agencies during the period 1900–1940 were concerned with the various forms of
reliance on their ratings, rather than with agency liability for ratings. Their data suggests
that litigation against CRAs during this period was extremely limited, in line with the very
few instances of libel suits against CRAs that we found.
124. Willets v. Poor, 126 N.Y.S. 926, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910). Cf. Poor’s Publ’g Co. v.
Banca Marmorosch Blank & Co., 193 N.Y.S. 950, 950 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922).
125. In re Bartol, 38 A. 527, 530 (Pa. 1897).
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Salability, good; net rating, A.”126
CRAs were not a major target of litigation after the Great Depression,
contrary to what one might expect, given their poor track record of per-
formance in the interwar period, especially when rating U.S. states and
municipalities.127 There were a few cases, but for the most part they did
not concern CRA liability to investors or regulators, and accordingly,
these decisions do not set a precedent for the contemporary liability of
CRAs. For instance, Fitch was sued for copyright infringement in 1923.128
Early lawsuits in which Moody’s was a party included Moody’s Investors
Service v. Taylor in 1938.129 A significant decision against Dun & Brad-
street came in 1936,130 and another came against Standard Statistics in
1942.131
B. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION AS THE PREVAILING DEFENSE
FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES132
For most of the post-World War II period, U.S. courts were unanimous
on the qualification of ratings as free speech. They did not address the
free speech vs. commercial speech dilemma until the 1980s.133 In the first
two decades of the twenty-first century, the First Amendment no longer
provides complete immunity to CRAs in respect of their ratings.
U.S. courts have traditionally considered ratings as speech protected by
the freedom of expression under the First Amendment, as the case law
below demonstrates. Yet, as this section shows, recent U.S. cases have
challenged the status of ratings as protected speech.134 In addition, cer-
tain non-U.S. jurisdictions have developed a duty of care owed by CRAs
to investors, despite the difficulties associated with identifying specific
civil-law liability norms in relation to erroneous or negligent ratings.135
126. In re Detre’s Estate, 117 A. 54, 56 (Pa. 1922). The court also relied on a Moody’s
rating in In re Winburn’s Will, 249 N.Y.S. 758, 762 (Sur. Ct. 1931).
127. See GEORGE H. HEMPEL, THE POSTWAR QUALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL DEBT
108-13 (Colum. Univ. Press 1971).
128. See Inv. Serv. Co. v. Fitch Pub. Co., 291 F. 1010, 1011 (7th Cir. 1923).
129. See generally Moody’s Inv’rs Serv. v. Taylor, 5 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div.1938).
130. See generally Century Bias Binding Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 292 N.Y.S. 950 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1936); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 11 N.E.2d 728, 737 (N.Y.
1937).
131. Standard Statistics Co. v. Davis, 45 N.E.2d 1005, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 1936).
132. See Aldo Caliari, Assessing Global Regulatory Impacts of the U.S. Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown: International Banking Supervision and the Regulation of Credit Rating
Agencies, 19 TRANSNATIONAL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2010); McVea, supra note 77;
Lawrence J. White, Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Less Regulation of
CRAs is a Better Response, 25 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 1 (2010).
133. Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 783 (1985).
134. Notably, this is illustrated by the Abu Dhabi litigation. See Abu Dhabi Comm.
Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
135. Comparative analysis of the liability of rating agency suggests that in most jurisdic-
tions it is difficult to identify such norms. See Uwe Blaurock, Control and Responsibility of
Credit Rating Agencies, 11 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 20 (2007). Due to the nature of the
assessments of risk made by rating agencies, the end product, a prediction of the future, is
difficult to prove correct or incorrect. This is the first problem with determining liability,
but it does not preclude the possibility of holding a rating agency liable, since it may be
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Most importantly, in November 2012, the Federal Court of Australia
(FCA) was the first in a common law jurisdiction to find that a rating
agency owed a duty of care to potential investors.136 The case arose out of
the sale ratings of complex collateralized debt obligations purchased by
Australian municipalities. The Australian court found that a reasonably
competent rating agency could not have rated the Rembrandt 2006-3
CPDO AAA under the circumstances at issue, and that Standard &
Poor’s AAA rating of the Rembrandt 2006-2 and 2006-3 CPDO notes
was “misleading and deceptive.” This was because the ratings involved
the publication of information or statements false in material particulars
and involved negligent misrepresentations to the class of potential inves-
tors in Australia, as the AAA rating conveyed that in S&P’s opinion, the
capacity of the notes to meet all financial obligations was “extremely
strong” and a representation that S&P’s opinion was based on reasonable
grounds and as the result of an exercise of reasonable care. Neither of
these representations were true, and S&P knew this at the time the repre-
sentations were made. Ultimately, the Australian court found S&P to be
jointly liable with ABN Amro and LGFS.137
The liability of rating agencies to issuers wishing to bring claims for
damages arising from, for example, low evaluations, unwarranted down-
grades, or a refusal to upgrade, may be sought by an issuer in a tort claim,
especially when the issuer did not request the rating and had not entered
into a contract with the rating agency.138 A tort claim of this type may be
limited by constitutional protections of free speech, which courts in many
jurisdictions have applied to published ratings, with a few possible excep-
tions such as Canada.139
In the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution states
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
possible to identify wrongful errors in the analysis, data sources, or methodologies em-
ployed by the agency. The first key distinction to be drawn is between liability based on a
wrongful product (difficult to show as anything but a subjective opinion) and liability
founded on wrongful means of obtaining the product (easier to show objectively justifiable
errors). However, proving that the means employed by a rating agency were wrongful may
be highly problematic due to lack of access to evidence or the highly contested nature of
the algorithms and other means of analysis used, and because these means are often not
transparently disclosed. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE
SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (Harv. U. Press 2015)
(providing an exhaustive analysis on how economic and financial strategies rely on hidden
algorithms).
136. See Bathurst Reg’l Council v Local Gov’t Fin Servs Pty Ltd (No. 5) [2012] FCA
1200, ¶ 2263 (Austl).
137. Id.
138. In 1996–1999, the Department of Justice examined whether Moody’s used the
threat of unsolicited ratings to grab market shares. No anti-competitive practices were
found. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Justice Dept. Inquiry on Moody’s Is Over, With No Charges
Filed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/13/business/justice-
dept-inquiry-on-moody-s-is-over-with-no-charges-filed.html. Traditionally, ratings were
only on request, but unsolicited ratings have become more common. See Davis, supra note
77, at 81 (referring to rating agencies as an example of the “symbiotic relationship between
those who measure and those who are measured”).
139. Blaurock, supra note 135, at 20.
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of the press.”140 Historically, U.S. courts have considered ratings as opin-
ions on matters of public concern, and therefore as protected speech
under the First Amendment. The actual malice exception, which provides
an exception to the First Amendment protection, has been of little assis-
tance to plaintiffs in litigation against rating agencies.141
The U.S. Supreme Court first used the standard in relation to credit
agencies in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,142 which concerned an ad-
vertisement in the New York Times that solicited funds to defend Martin
Luther King, Jr. against an Alabama perjury indictment. The Montgom-
ery Public Safety Commissioner (Sullivan) alleged that the advertisement
included inaccurate information in relation to police action against civil
rights protesters, and that this amounted to a defamatory act against him,
although the advertisement did not name Sullivan himself.143 The Court
held that the First Amendment “prohibits a public official from recover-
ing damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’— that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.”144
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Compuware v. Moody’s Investors Ser-
vice145 considered ratings as opinions on matters of public concern.
Moody’s rating of Compuware, a publicly held corporation, was subject
to the standard of actual malice.146 The court found that a
Moody’s credit rating is a predictive opinion, dependent on a subjec-
tive and discretionary weighing of complex factors. We find no basis
upon which we could conclude that the credit rating itself communi-
cates any probably false factual connotation. Even if we could draw
any fact-based inferences from this rating, such inferences could not
be proven false because of the inherently subjective nature of
Moody’s ratings calculation.147
This decision represents the traditional position in relation to First
Amendment protection of ratings.148 According to an established line of
cases, credit ratings fall within the scope of First Amendment protection.
Consequently, the orthodox position is that CRAs were not liable to in-
vestors even when there was a contract between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant.149 In Jefferson County School District v. Moody’s Investor’s
140. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
141. In 2011, Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2011), created a
further hurdle. The Second Circuit established that investors suing in federal courts need to
show that agencies did not believe their own ratings at the time they issued them.
142. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
143. Id. at 256–57.
144. Id. at 279–80.
145. Compuware v. Moody’s Inv. Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007).
146. Id. at 525.
147. Id. at 529.
148. Cf. Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 155 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
149. For example, Orange County sued the parent company of S&P following the bank-
ruptcy of Orange County. See MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE OR-
ANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 1–33 (U. of Cal. Press 1998).
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Services, Inc., the Tenth Circuit upheld a lower court in granting First
Amendment protection to Moody’s.150 The case concerned a contractual
claim against Moody’s by a school district for intentional interference
with contractual obligations after Moody’s published a “negative out-
look” on its bonds. In In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & “ER-
ISA” Litigation, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas
granted First Amendment protection and dismissed negligent misrepre-
sentation claims.151 In Fait v. Regions Financial Corp., the Second Circuit
required investors suing in federal courts to show that agencies did not
believe their own ratings at the time they issued them—a very high
threshold.152
Importantly, this First Amendment line of cases has limited the SEC’s
ability to regulate CRAs. Freedom of speech has acted as a shield to
meaningful regulation of CRAs by the main federal securities regulator,
even if the SEC had wanted to subject CRAs to strong regulation and
oversight.153 CRAs have argued that they are like members of the finan-
cial press, their ratings being akin to a short editorial.154 In some cases,
the courts agreed. For example, in First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Stan-
dard & Poor’s, S&P was effectively treated as part of the media indus-
try.155 First Equity had brought a claim for negligent misstatement
against S&P after it had suffered a loss of $200,000 because it relied on
recommendations in the CRA’s publications. In other cases, however,
CRAs were not able to avail themselves of the protections under New
York’s press shield laws concerning discovery, on the basis that the CRA
had not shown that it gathered information pursuant to a news function.
Rather, it acted more for the needs of its clients.156
C. LITIGATION UNDER SECURITIES LAW
Investors and regulators have also brought some claims against CRAs
under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Section 11 provides for liability
150. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv. Servs., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 1341,
1348 (D. Colo. 1997), aff’d, 175 F.d 848 (10th Cir. 1999). Cf. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv-
ative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 827 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
151. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
152. Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2011). For further commen-
tary on the implications of the case, see Javier Bleichmar & Cynthia Hanawalt, The Evolv-
ing Legacy Of ‘Fait v. Regions Financial’, N.Y. L. J. (May 3, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www
.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202598476986/ [http://perma.cc/CLS9-VAWQ].
153. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985). For further comment, see Francis A.
Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Pro-
posals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 615–20 (1993).
154. See Gregory Husisian, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest
Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1990);
Jonathan W. Heggen, Not Always the World’s Shortest Editorial: Why Credit-Rating-
Agency Speech Is Sometimes Professional Speech, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1758–59 (2011).
155. First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 690 F. Supp 256, 257
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989); see also In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R.
577, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370 (E.D. Pa.
1992).
156. Fitch v. UBS, 330 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2003).
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for material misstatements and omissions in public offering documents.
Traditionally, these securities claims have failed because the courts did
not regard CRAs as “underwriters” within the meaning of § 11.157
In Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co, investors
relied upon a CRA’s negligent misstatement regarding the terms of a se-
curities offering.158 Mallinckrodt Chemical Works filed this action against
Goldman Sachs alleging violations of § 12(2) and § 17(a) of the Securities
Act. Jurisdiction was, among others, based on § 22(a) of the Act. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to hold
Goldman Sachs liable for its misstatement of the terms of a security offer-
ing in the CRA’s regular publications. Two factors were important to the
court. First, the investor was not in privity with Goldman Sachs, apart
from a simple subscription agreement for the rating publications. Second,
Mallinckrodt could have referred to the original prospectus for the cor-
rect description, but failed to do so.
In First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s, an investor had relied upon
a rating agency’s incorrectly high rating of a company’s commercial pa-
per.159 The court found the rating was not negligent, even though the
company had arguably used oversimplified accounting methods and the
CRA overlooked important financial information, such as company
losses hundreds of millions of dollars. The court found that the subscrip-
tion agreement was insufficient to establish the degree of privity of con-
tract necessary to give rise to liability in the face of other important
factors.
At the dawn of the subprime crisis of 2007–2008, S&P, Moody’s, and
Fitch were in an exceptional position: they posted very high profit mar-
gins, acted as de facto regulator in capital markets, and enjoyed quasi-
judicial immunity. However, the transition into advisory services changed
the nature of their speech. Combined with a tendency to inflate ratings in
order to grab market shares, this transformation made CRAs much more
vulnerable to lawsuits, especially from investors.
IV. THE EROSION OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
DEFENSE FOR CRAS
This Section shows how the impenetrable shield that CRAs enjoyed in
U.S. courts has eroded over the last decade. We document that once rat-
ings no longer benefited from heightened constitutional protection for
(political) free speech, CRAs faced the specter of liability. Increasingly,
courts came to regard ratings as mere commercial speech that did not
raise major public concerns—in contrast to the heightened constitutional
157. The position remains largely unchanged after the global financial crisis. See infra
Section III.
158. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 420 F. Supp. 231, 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
159. First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir.
1989).
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protection for political free speech under the First Amendment. We ex-
amine recent litigations against CRAs to demonstrate this important shift
in the approach of U.S. courts.
A. CREDIT RATINGS AS A FORM OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The development of the issuer-pay model160 from 1968 raised questions
about whether ratings constitute commercial speech—a type of communi-
cation that, under the First Amendment, receives less robust protection.
The courts have refined the definition of commercial speech under the
First Amendment over the years. That said, in U.S. constitutional law,
commercial speech is a flexible category that has remained open to new
categories of speech. The requalification of credit ratings as mere com-
mercial speech, rather than as free speech, represents an important shift
that challenged the quasi-immunity of CRAs. The figure below shows the
evolution of litigation against CRAs.
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CRAs have argued that the category of “commercial speech,” which is
subject to lessened First Amendment protections, is limited to promo-
tional advertising. In contrast, credit ratings are merely opinions (inde-
pendent evaluations) about commercial transactions that do not
themselves propose commercial transactions162 and qualify for full First
Amendment protection. They are not “commercial speech.”
160. See supra Section II.A.
161. This graphic is based on sixty-eight reported cases. We compiled a complete set of
cases brought against CRAs in the United States. We performed searches on Westlaw and
LexisNexis involving one of today’s major three CRAs, known by their current (Fitch,
Moody’s, S&P) or former (Poor’s and Standard Statistics) names, and parents and
subsidiaries. We excluded cases that do not relate to the liability based on ratings, such as
employment lawsuits. Since we focus on publicly available judicial opinions, there may be
some bias in case selection by LexisNesis and Westlaw. See John Armour et al., Delaware’s
Balancing Act, 87 INDIANA L.J. 1346, 1355 (2012). Searches on PACER for cases filed
suggest that selectivity is not a major concern for the last two decades, but it could be a
significant concern for earlier periods.
162. Letter from Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas C. Goldstein, Legal Consultants,
Moody’s, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 14, 2009).
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In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the U.S. Supreme Court defined
commercial speech as speech that does nothing more than propose a
transaction. The plaintiffs had brought a First Amendment challenge
against a Virginia law, which prohibited the advertisement of prices for
prescription drugs by pharmacists who would otherwise be guilty of “un-
professional conduct.” The Court took the view that “[p]eople will per-
ceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and
. . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them.”163 It further held that “[a]s to the particular
consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information, that inter-
est may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most
urgent political debate.”164 That the speaker’s interest is purely economic
is irrelevant in determining whether the speech is protected.165 The Court
held that while commercial speech is protected speech under the First
Amendment, the state could regulate some forms of commercial speech.
It may be restricted if (1) it is justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech, (2) it serves a significant governmental interest, and
(3) in doing so, it leaves ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.166
In Central Hudson Gas & Electricity Corporation, concerning a chal-
lenge to a Public Service Commission regulation that prohibited promo-
tional advertising by electric utilities, the Supreme Court defined
commercial speech as expression that relates solely to the economic inter-
ests of the speaker and its audience.167 The negative definition of com-
mercial speech is more helpful than its positive counterpart. Accordingly,
commercial speech is not speech on which money has been spent to pro-
ject the speech; it is not speech in a form that is sold for profit; it is not
speech that solicits money; nor is it speech on a commercial subject.168
LaSalle v. Duff & Phelps represents an important shift in the history of
lawsuits involving CRAs.169 The plaintiff, LaSalle National Bank, claimed
that Duff & Phelps failed to properly review and monitor the bonds in
question, and alleged that this failure caused it material loss in reliance on
the agency’s AA rating. The plaintiff alleged that the rating agency acted
without the necessary due diligence and had orally misrepresented the
security of the bonds. Crucially, the court rejected the argument that a
publisher of credit ratings is a member of the free press and thereby enti-
tled to the same privileges. Since LaSalle had privately contracted with
163. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)).
164. Id. at 763.
165. Id. at 762.
166. Id. at 771.
167. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
168. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627, 638 (1990).
169. LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071, 1086
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Duff & Phelps with respect to a private placement Offering Memoranda,
rather than for publication to the public, it was not entitled to the privi-
leges of a journalist. The New York district court also rejected the CRA’s
attempt to rely on the “actual malice” standard, established in New York
Times v. Sullivan.170
LaSalle sowed the seeds of the collapse of the immunity defense for
CRAs. When CRAs developed ancillary businesses in the 1990s, courts
were more likely to regard their ratings as commercial speech and deny
CRAs full First Amendment protection for two reasons.171 First, CRAs
disseminated SF products (SFP) typically to a small group of qualified
institutional investors for securities offered under Rule 144A.172 Second,
ratings were solely in the individual interests of CRAs and their audience.
B. THE “PUBLIC CONCERN” CONDITION FOR
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
For the most part, the First Amendment has protected CRAs not be-
cause they are analogous to journalists, but instead because their ratings
touch upon matters of public concern. Those who publish information to
the community at large, even where paid by advertisers to do so, face no
liability in libel when they speak on matters of public concern, unless they
knowingly or recklessly publish false information. The crucial factor for
whether ratings touch public concern is whether the ratings are available
to the public at large or only to a select group of investors. Importantly,
speech directed at “a specific business audience” does not qualify as a
matter of public concern. In the absence of a matter of public concern,
courts have tended to reject a CRA’s invocation of the First
Amendment.173
Whether something is a matter of public concern hinges on its content,
form, and context.174 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, an
important precedent dating back to the 1980s, the Supreme Court consid-
ered ratings to raise “private” rather than “public” concern.175 The Su-
preme Court established that “a credit rating’s content, form, and context
170. Id. at 1096–97.
171. For example, Moody’s and S&P developed “risk consulting” businesses through
the creation of their “Rating Assessment Service” and “Ratings Evaluation Service,” re-
spectively. See New Interests, New Conflicts, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2001), https://www.econ-
omist.com/finance-and-economics/2001/04/12/new-interests-new-conflicts [https://perma.cc/
L9MR-KEYP]. SEC, REPORT TO CONGRESS: CREDIT RATING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
STUDY 18 (Nov. 2013) (a recent analysis of NRSRO ancillary services).
172. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2017).
173. E.g., Genesee Cty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Tr. 2006-3, 825 F.
Supp. 2d 1082, 1237 (D.N.M. 2011).
174. The leading case is Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749,
763 (1985). See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983); In re Nat’l Century Fin.
Enters., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639–40 (S.D. Ohio 2008); Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v.
Moody’s Invs. Serv., Inc., 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 238, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); Jonathan S. Sack
& Kefira R. Wilderman, Civil Liability of Rating Agencies: Past Success, Future Danger?,
N.Y. L. J. 4 (Sept. 15, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/almID/1202472017174/.
175. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763.
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. . . indicate[s] whether such rating is of public concern or not.”176 It con-
cluded that First Amendment immunity did not apply because the speech
was only “in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience.”177 The Court distinguished credit reporting agencies from the
traditional media because, unlike the traditional media, they are “in the
business of selling financial information to . . . subscribers who have paid
substantial fees for their services.” And the statements were “solely moti-
vated by the desire for profit.”178
In Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York applied the Dun & Bradstreet test,
departing from the traditional position in relation to the First Amend-
ment defense.179 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank alleged negligent misrep-
resentation and other fraudulent behavior by Moody’s and S&P. The
court rejected the CRAs’ claim to First Amendment protection on the
basis that they disseminated the ratings only to a select group of investors
in connection with a private placement. The ratings were therefore not a
matter of public concern.180 The court applied a three-part test to deter-
mine whether ratings were a matter of public concern: (1) how widely did
the CRA disseminate the report; (2) the CRA’s state of mind and its
knowledge; and (3) the CRA’s conflicts of interest in providing the
rating.181
In the earlier case of In re National Century, the Southern District
Court for Ohio rejected the defendant’s First Amendment arguments be-
cause the ratings aimed at a “specified business audience,” citing Dun &
Bradstreet, and hence did not qualify as a matter of public concern. Ac-
cordingly, the court dismissed claims based on common law fraud and
§10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against the rating agencies,
but upheld claims of negligent misrepresentation, and aiding and abetting
fraud.182 In Kings County, Washington v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank
AG, the District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld
common law fraud claims against a rating agency for assigning allegedly
false and misleading high ratings to certain structured finance
products.183
In In re Fitch, the Second Circuit denied First Amendment protection
to Fitch. It reasoned that a Fitch employee took “a fairly active role . . . in
176. For example, in Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., ratings were disseminated to a select
group of investors in connection with a private placement rather than to the general public.
See 172 Cal. Rptr. at 639–40.
177. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 753.
178. Id. at 762.
179. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155,
175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 176–80.
182. In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D.
Ohio 2008).
183. See King County v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
1106 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
commenting on proposed transactions and offering suggestions about
how to model the transactions to reach the desired ratings,” which
demonstrated “a level of involvement with the client’s transactions that is
not typical of the relationship between a journalist and the activities upon
which the journalist reports.”184 Fitch was a non-party to the actual case.
It merely tried to quash a subpoena. Because Fitch was not behaving like
a typical journalist, the court held that its CDO rating was not an issue
“of public concern.” Fitch could not avail itself of protection under the
First Amendment, and the court accordingly dismissed its request to
quash the subpoena.
Central to the common law claims brought in U.S. courts is the distinc-
tion between publicly available statements that are provided with the
prime intention of serving private clients on the one hand, and statements
that are aimed at the public at large on the other hand. Traditionally, the
courts grant freedom of speech protection only in relation to the latter
category—information intended for public consumption. Conversely,
such protection does not apply where the CRA provides information to a
group of private individuals, notwithstanding its availability to the
public.185
In summary, the First Amendment likely offers CRAs strong protec-
tion if their ratings implicate matters of public concern and are akin to
mere opinions containing no verifiable facts. In such situations, CRAs
face liability for fraud only in the extraordinary case where plaintiffs can
prove that CRAs did not believe that the ratings that they distributed
were accurate (the actual malice standard). In contrast, where they either
communicate their opinions in a professional capacity to targeted inves-
tors or do no more than propose a commercial transaction, they likely
face more extensive liability for common law negligence, misrepresenta-
tion or fraud.
V. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AS A CATALYST
FOR RATING AGENCIES
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, private litigants, the U.S.
federal government and various state governments, public pension funds,
and others brought dozens of lawsuits against CRAs in state and federal
courts against the three major CRAs for ratings issued prior to the finan-
184. In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
185. See LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071,
1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Fitch, 330 F.3d at 110 (holding that Fitch did not deserve free
speech protection when its services were client-driven and it was actively involved in struc-
turing the underlying transactions); see also Commercial Fin. Servs. v. Arthur Andersen
LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 113 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004); Nathan Koppel, Credit Raters Plead the First.
Will It Fly?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12402742711463
7327 [http://perma.cc/78PW-WD54] (“The more it looks like [ratings] firms were hired spe-
cifically to do this one rating for this one company . . . the less likely it is that the First
Amendment will be applied.”) (quoting Larry Ellsworth, former litigator at the SEC).
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cial crisis.186 In several cases, courts issued judgments against the rating
agencies. In others, the parties reached out-of-court settlements. The
most significant settlement to date between the CRAs and a private
claimant concerned the California Public Employee Retirement System
(CALPERs). In 2015 and 2016, respectively, CALPERs settled with S&P
and Moody’s for a combined total of $255 million, representing the larg-
est known recovery from S&P and Moody’s from a private lawsuit relat-
ing to damages from ratings. In litigating against CRAs, First
Amendment arguments have been common, as we have seen in the previ-
ous section. However, they no longer provide an absolute shield to CRA
liability.
A. INVESTOR SUITS AGAINST RATING AGENCIES
In the wake of the global financial crisis, some investors sued CRAs for
misrepresentation at common law. To date, no U.S. court has held a CRA
liable to investors for misrepresentation or securities law violations. But
there have been several important settlements.
In the common law fraud context, as articulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, opinions are defined as follows: “A representation is
one of opinion if it expresses only (a) the belief of the maker, without
certainty, as to the existence of a fact; or (b) his judgment as to quality,
value, authenticity, or other matters of judgment.”187 Courts routinely
cite this definition in misrepresentation cases.188 In the wake of the stock
market crash of 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008, the issue surfaced in
securities litigation concerning whether statements are factual assertions
that amount to more than mere opinions. In addition to rating agency
“opinions,” defendants have argued that the opinions of securities-analyst
and statements of corporate optimism are protected by the First
Amendment.189
In one of the most significant lawsuits against CRAs to date, fourteen
plaintiffs, led by Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB), accused CRAs
of negligent misrepresentation over their activities regarding two struc-
tured investment vehicles190 (Cheyne and Rhinebridge), claiming that the
CRAs misled the plaintiffs about the true risk levels.191 They also alleged
186. Joel Rosenblatt & Matt Scully, Moody’s Settles Calpers Ratings Lawsuit for $130
Million, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2016, 12:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-03-09/calpers-says-moody-s-to-pay-130-million-to-settle-ratings-case.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
188. See, e.g., McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp., 650 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1995); Consol. Papers, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 451 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989); Marino v. United Bank of Ill., N.A., 484 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
189. City of Omaha Civilian Emps. Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., 679 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir.
2012).
190. A structured investment vehicle is a fund that borrows money by issuing short-
term securities at a low interest rate and then lends that money by purchasing long-term
securities at higher interest.
191. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 460
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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conflict of interests stemming from the issuer-pays fee system that the
rating agencies use, and claimed more than $700 million in damages. The
allegations very much resemble those by the U.S. Department of Justice
in the suit against S&P (see next section)—i.e., fraudulently inflating rat-
ings to win rating business.192 S&P, in its defense, used similar arguments
to those in its dispute with the U.S. Department of Justice, pointing to its
First Amendment right to free speech.
The parties settled their dispute a week before trial, and the terms of
the settlement remain confidential.193 It would have marked the first jury
trial on the rating agencies’ conduct before the financial crisis. In their
public statements, all parties seemed to be satisfied with the settlement,
especially the rating agencies, which try to avoid any litigation on their
pre-financial crisis rating behavior. Moody’s commented, “[t]his settle-
ment allows us to put the significant legal defense and related costs, as
well as the distraction, of these protracted litigations behind us. . . . We
are satisfied that it is in the best interests of our company and sharehold-
ers.”194 The official statement of ADCB states that it “is satisfied with the
outcome of the settlement. The original investment had already been
fully provisioned and receipt of the settlement process will have a positive
but relatively limited impact on ADCB’s balance sheet.”195
In 2013, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
struck out a claim against Moody’s. The plaintiffs alleged that Moody’s
had made false statements about the independence and objectivity of its
“issuer-pays” model of its credit ratings business.196 They further argued
that Moody’s had made numerous misrepresentations in its code of con-
duct, annual reports to its shareholders and other publications, concealing
conflicts in its rating of structured finance securities. The court held that
the plaintiffs failed to establish that the rating agency violated federal
securities laws—specifically, § 10(b) and § 20(a) of the Securities Ex-
192. See, e.g., Stephen Foley, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Settle US Subprime Law-
suits, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/27a59708-af46-11e2-ac6f-
00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/A88C-DRBF]; Jeannette Neumann, S&P, Moody’s Settle
Ratings Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127
887323789704578447561293487032 [https://perma.cc/493P-JFVC]; Antoine Gara, S&P,
Moody’s Shares Surge on Fraud Lawsuit Settlement, THESTREET (Apr. 29, 2013, 4:48 PM),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/11908039/1/sp-moodys-lingering-legal-risks.html [https://
perma.cc/8QXX-V9YD]; see also Letter from William J. Harrington to Elizabeth M. Mur-
phy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 29, 2014) (providing a remarkable analysis of in-
flated ratings in the SF market).
193. See Nate Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, Moody’s, S&P settle lawsuits over debt
vehicle ratings, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2013, 7:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
moodys-sp-settlement-idUSL2N0DE00Q20130427 [http://perma.cc/AV8T-LUVF]; Hadeel
al Sayegh, ADCB ends legal battle with Morgan Stanley over soured investment, THE NA-
TIONAL (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.thenational.ae/business/adcb-ends-legal-battle-with-
morgan-stanley-over-soured-investment-1.365077 [http://perma.cc/V3XR-26G5].
194. Sayegh, supra note 193.
195. Shane McGinley, UAE bank settles legal case with rating agencies, ARABIAN BUS.
(Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.arabianbusiness.com/uae-bank-settles-legal-case-with-rating-
agencies-499819.html [https://perma.cc/XXJ9-GWXB].
196. In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 8375(GBD), 2013 WL 4516788, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2013).
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change Act of 1934. The plaintiffs failed to show a sufficient causal link
between the alleged misstatements and subsequent declines in Moody’s
share prices. None of the events listed that the plaintiffs losses were
linked sufficiently closely to Moody’s alleged misrepresentations to jus-
tify a securities fraud claim. The court concluded that “[p]laintiffs must
proffer some evidence demonstrating that Moody’s specific alleged mis-
representations caused the materialization of the risk that Moody’s rating
practices were unsustainable. They fail to do so.”197
In In re Lehman Bros. Securities and ERISA Litigation, investors who
purchased mortgage pass-through certificates sued S&P and Moody’s
under §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 for alleged
misrepresentations, on the theory that CRAs could be sued as statutory
underwriters, sellers, or control persons. The court dismissed these
claims, holding that the rating agencies’ alleged activities did not make
them statutory underwriters, sellers, or control persons.198
Courts have refused some of these § 11 claims based on SEC Rule
436(g)(1). As we saw above, Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act of 1933
granted a special type of immunity to CRAs. Yet Section 939G of the
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 repealed this rule, opening the way for future
claims against CRAs. Accordingly, CRAs could now be liable for false
ratings published in registration statements with the SEC for new
offerings.
CRAs have also been sued on the ground that their misconduct fell
within the scope of the False Claims Act, which allows private individuals
to allege that the government has been defrauded. In Kolchinsky v.
Moody’s,199 Kolchinsky alleged that inflated ratings by Moody had dam-
aged government programs. Kolchinsky was a former managing director
of the derivatives group at Moody’s. He claimed that Moody’s retaliated
when he disclosed his fears that Moody’s was engineering credit ratings
by using rating methods Moody’s knew to be inappropriate or misleading.
In 2016, Moody’s brought a motion to dismiss. Moody’s first argued that
Kolchinsky had violated the False Claims Act himself by bringing a claim
founded on allegations that he had publicly circulated. However, Kolchin-
sky rebutted that argument by successfully showing that he was the origi-
nal source of the allegations.200 Kolchinsky had various possible theories
about how Moody’s had defrauded the government. However, Moody’s
197. Id.
198. In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 495, 500 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). Other relevant cases considered in this research were Tsereteli v. Residential Asset
Securitization Tr. 2006–A8, 692 F. Supp. 2d 387, 396 (S.D.N.Y 2010); In re Indymac Mort-
gage-Backed Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 2d 495, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); N.J. Carpenters Vaca-
tion Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254, 263–64 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); In re Wells Fargo Mortgage-Backed Certificates Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 958, 968–69
(N.D. Cal. 2010); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d 475,
484–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
199. United States ex rel. Kolchinsky v. Moody’s Corp., 162 F. Supp. 3d 186, 195
(S.D.N.Y. 2016).
200. Id. at 194.
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succeeded in dismissing four out of five of Kolchinsky’s theories.201
Kolchinsky was given leave to refile on the remaining issue. Kolchinsky v.
Moody’s demonstrates that the False Claims Act is not a workable tool to
tackle fraudulent ratings, as it requires a close link between fraudulence
and reimbursement by a government program not evident in many rat-
ings cases.202
The settlements between the CRAs and several private investors show
how CRAs run a significantly higher risk of liability since the subprime
crisis. Those settlements between S&P, Moody’s, and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice have been momentous in the sense that both major CRAs
agreed to make record payments to the governments in relation to their
rating activity.
B. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
AGAINST RATING AGENCIES
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA) provides for a novel civil cause of action against
CRAs.203 Further, FIRREA lowers the standard of proof.204 When com-
pared to the criminal standard of proof, FIRREA is a “walk in the park
for government attorneys.”205 Claimants must prove only that the defen-
dant committed one of FIRREA’s predicate offenses by a “preponder-
ance of the evidence” rather than to a criminal standard of “beyond
reasonable doubt.”206 FIRREA provides for criminal prosecution, but
also allows the U.S. Attorney General to bring civil actions to recover
civil penalties for several banking crimes.207 FIRREA provides for civil
penalties, including $1 million for one-time violations, and up to $5 mil-
lion for continuing violations of one of the underlying criminal statutes.
201. Id. at 200.
202. This remains the case even after Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). This decision represents a significant development for the
False Claims Act because the Supreme Court confirmed in the context of pharmaceuticals
that implied certification could form the basis for liability. However, the court stressed a
high bar for materiality, requiring that compliance must be knowingly part of the govern-
ment’s payment decision, and stated that the FCA was now an all-purpose anti-fraud
statute.
203. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1833(a) (2012)). See
generally Nan S. Ellis et al., Use of FIRREA to Impose Liability in the Wake of the Global
Financial Crisis: A New Weapon in the Arsenal to Prevent Fraud, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 119
(2015).
204. Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, The Financial Institutions Reform Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989: Dealing with Regulators, 107 BANKING L.J. 196, 221 (1990).
205. Jay Williams et al., FIRREA: An Old Acronym Is Turning into the Government’s
New Hammer on Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 129 BANKING L.J. 579, 580 (2012).
206. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f) (2012).
207. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act §§ 901–63. See
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the
Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 943 (2005); see also
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Politics and Corporate Crime Legislation, 27 REGULATION 30, 30
(2004) (observing that corporations would prefer criminal legislation to civil suits because
there is greater private civil enforcement and higher criminal procedural standards).
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The criminal penalties available are in addition to the civil penalties,
which may be recovered by the federal banking agencies, as well as to any
criminal fines imposed for the same offenses. Finally, unlike the three-
year to five-year statute of limitations under typical state civil fraud stat-
utes, FIRREA carries a ten-year statute of limitations.208 Many recent
FIRREA complaints filed in the last years sought relief under both the
False Claims Act (“FCA”) and FIRREA.209
In 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (as well as nineteen states and
the District of Columbia)210 claimed civil penalties under FIRREA
against S&P for allegedly defrauding investors out of $5 billion in mort-
gage-related securities.211 They claimed civil penalties amounting to a
sum of $5 billion from S&P for “(a) mail fraud affecting federally insured
financial institutions; (b) wire fraud affecting federally insured financial
institutions; and (c) financial institution fraud.”212 The claimants alleged
that the ratings depicted an incorrect picture of the market, portraying
the securities as much safer than they in fact were:
S&P, knowingly and with the intent to defraud, devised, participated
in, an executed a scheme to defraud investors in RMBS and CDO
tranches, including federally insured financial institutions, as to ma-
terial matters, and to obtain money from these investors by means of
material false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and
promises, and the concealment of material facts.213
It allegedly “limited, adjusted, and delayed updates to the ratings criteria
and analytical models S&P used to access the credit risks,” and
knowing that the credit risks of certain non-prime RMBS tranches
were increasing, were expected to continue to increase, and were an-
ticipated to result in negative Rating Actions . . . knowingly disre-
garded the true extent of the credit risks associated with those non-
prime RMBS tranches in issuing and/or confirming ratings for CDOs
208. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(h) (2012).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Americus Mort. Corp., No. 8:12-cv-02676, 2013 WL
4829271 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2013); United States v. Luce, No. 11-cv-5158, 2012 WL
2359357 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2012); Complaint, United States ex rel. Hunt v. CitiMortgage,
No. 1:11-cv-5473(VM) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012); Complaint, United States v. Buy-A-
Home, LLC, No. 10-cv-9820 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2010), 2010 WL 5415787. On the litigation
against CRAs under the False Claims Act, see cases included in this note.
210. The states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington.
211. To our knowledge, the Department of Justice was the first plaintiff to sue a CRA
under FIRREA. Tom Wicker, US Department of Justice prosecutes Standard & Poor’s as
tide turns against ratings agencies, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.ibanet.org/
Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=af324fa2-7e0c-4ce8-89f0-e5e4bcd86827 [https://perma
.cc/L5YT-NY58]. Ironically, the U.S. Department of Justice decided to claim civil penalties
under FIRREA against S&P, whereas FIRREA referred to NRSRO ratings to force the
savings and loan industry to reduce the riskiness of its asset portfolios. See Alex M. Azar,
FIRREA: Controlling Savings and Loan Association Credit Risk Through Capital Stan-
dards and Asset Restrictions, 100 YALE L.J. 149, 162–63 (1990).
212. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at ¶ 1, United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 302
F.R.D. 532 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) (No. CV 13-00779-DOC (JCGx)).
213. Id. ¶ 7.
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with exposure to those non-prime RMBS tranches.214
Accordingly, S&P misled investors by the erroneous RMBS and CDO
ratings, which did not represent S&P’s true opinion on their creditworthi-
ness at the time.
The alleged motive for such positive ratings and the downplaying of the
true extent of the credit risks posed by RMBS and CDO tranches was a
desire to increase business with large investment banks, which would
thereby boost S&P’s market share for credit ratings of RMBS and
CDOs.215 Crucial to this incentive structure is the “issuer pays” model.
As a result of S&P’s conduct, federally insured financial institutions in-
vested in RMBS and CDO tranches that were assigned high ratings and
consequently suffered financial loss when the true risk level materialized.
S&P invoked its First Amendment right to criticize the government. It
rejected the claimant’s allegations and saw the suit as a form of payback
for the rating agency’s decision to downgrade the United States’ rating
from AAA to AA+ in 2011.216 It alleged that the Department of Justice
singled out S&P due to its downgrade of the U.S. market, while they left
untouched all other major rating agencies that had also misrated securi-
ties in the relevant period. The case of Egan Jones, which also down-
graded the U.S. and was later investigated by U.S. authorities, might
substantiate S&P’s allegation.217 Credit risk expert Marc Joffe pointed
out that “both [Egan Jones and S&P] downgraded the U.S. and subse-
quently faced disciplinary action from the U.S. government. Perhaps this
helps explain why Moody’s chose to downgrade the U.K. while leaving
the US at Aaa.”218 Others argue that the Justice Department only sued
S&P—or sued it first—because (1) it is the world’s biggest rating agency
and (2) there was a considerable paper trail indicating guilt on the part of
S&P.219
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The U.S. Department of Justice and McGraw-Hill Financial, alongside
nineteen states and the District of Columbia, settled on February 3, 2015
for $1.375 billion. According to then-Attorney General Eric Holder,
under the settlement, S&P conceded that “company executives com-
plained that the company declined to downgrade underperforming assets
because it was worried that doing so would hurt the company’s busi-
ness.”220 It did not, however, admit to violating any laws. The CRA with-
drew its allegations that the United States’ FIRREA complaint against it
was a retaliatory measure because of S&P’s 2011 decision to place the
U.S. on credit watch negative and following downgrade of its credit
rating.221
In September 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice stated that it pre-
pared a civil complaint to be filed against Moody’s in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging certain violations of the
FIRREA in connection with the ratings Moody’s assigned to RMBS and
CDO prior to 2008. The Department of Justice also stated that its investi-
gations could expand. Several states’ attorneys general indicated they in-
tended to pursue similar claims under state law.222 This civil complaint is
not so surprising: Phil Angelides, who led the bipartisan Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission that published a report in 2011, said that what they
found at Moody’s “was very similar to the practices and conduct at Stan-
dard & Poor’s. The conduct and results were the same.”223 Finally, on
January 13, 2017, the “Department of Justice, 21 states, and the District of
Columbia reached a nearly $864 million settlement agreement with
Moody’s.”224
The SEC, as the market regulator, has also launched enforcement ac-
tions against CRAs. In the first-ever enforcement action against a major
rating agency, the SEC fined S&P a total of $77 million.225 The action
dealt with six commercial mortgage-based securities (CMBS) that S&P
rated in 2011. Similar to the Justice Department’s suit against S&P, the
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SEC claimed that the rating agency had fraudulently bent criteria to win
more business. According to the SEC, it “elevated its own financial inter-
ests above investors by loosening its rating criteria to obtain business and
then obscuring these changes from investors.”226 The SEC furthermore
banned S&P from rating such bonds for a period of one year. However,
the effect of the ban on S&P was minimal, as it was limited to the rating
of loans to multiple borrowers—a sector in which S&P accounted for
only 9% of the deals in 2014.227 S&P could continue to rate single-bor-
rower CMBS, a market in which the rating agency rates 82% of all
offerings.
Additionally, the SEC also pursued administrative proceedings against
the former head of S&P’s CMBS Group, Barbara Duka, for fraudulent
misrepresentation in relation to the manner in which the rating agency
calculated an aspect of certain CMBS ratings in 2011.228 Duka responded
by contending that the SEC proceedings were constitutionally defective
and fought to have her case heard in a federal court. Duka succeeded and
the SEC proceedings were frozen. The SEC initially looked to appeal but
in 2016 dropped its appeal.229
It is noteworthy that CALPERs sued both Moody’s and S&P related to
allegedly negligent misrepresentations under California law in connection
to the ratings of three structured investment vehicles in which CALPERs
invested $1.3 billion. A 2014 Californian Appeals Court decision denying
the rating agencies’ motion to strike out likely prompted the settlement,
as the claimants had made a prima facie case of negligent misrepresenta-
tions.230 Further, the court rejected the agencies’ allegation that the case
should be dismissed on First Amendment grounds; the court considered
that credit ratings issued in relation to a structured investment vehicle
were only issued in relation to a limited class of investors. Therefore, they
were not of public concern and not did not warrant actual malice protec-
tion. The judge considered that it would be premature, however, to de-
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cide the First Amendment point.231 In February 2015, CALPERs and
S&P reached a settlement worth $125 million. Similarly, in March 2016,
Moody’s settled with CALPERs for $130 million.232
The settlements that Moody’s and S&P had to consent to during
2013–2017 reflect the increasing fragility of the First Amendment protec-
tion. In fact, CRAs lost their “quasi-immunity” because the nature of
their ratings changed substantially in the 1990s–2000s. The subprime cri-
sis served as a catalyst; the lawsuits that followed obliged Moody’s and
S&P to admit that their ratings are no longer regarded, by default, as
opinions.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the eve of the mortgage market crisis of 2007, CRAs were less lia-
ble and more powerful than ever. They experienced a quasi-immunity re-
gime in the United States and Europe. Most investors used their ratings,
and many regulatory rules incorporated ratings. In 2008–2011, the investi-
gations and hearings that the SEC and the U.S. Senate held established
that ratings had serious shortcomings, which upset the credit rating busi-
ness. First, starting in 2010, U.S. and European legislators and regulators
cut overreliance on credit ratings.233 This new pattern was a major shift
for U.S. investors, as the OCC enacted the first regulatory rule incorpo-
rating credit ratings in 1931. Second, CRAs have faced more and more
lawsuits since the late 2000s.
In fact, we argue in this article that CRAs lost their regulatory and
judicial “quasi-immunity” over the last decade, partly as a result of their
behavior in the lead-up to the subprime crisis. CRAs succumbed to the
“Icarus Syndrome,” believing that they were above the law, shielded by
the First Amendment from potential liability for ratings. CRAs enjoyed
“quasi-immunity” as long as they assigned their ratings in the interest of
investors and the courts considered them protected speech under the
First Amendment. Historically, U.S. courts have considered ratings as
opinions on matters of public concern, and therefore as protected speech
under the First Amendment. CRAs have long argued that they are like
members of the financial press, their ratings being akin to a short edito-
rial. In some cases, the courts have effectively treated CRAs as part of
the media industry. For most of the post-World War II period, U.S. courts
were unanimous on the qualification of ratings as free speech.
This quasi-immunity was also a deterrent for litigation against CRAs ex
ante. Precisely because the First Amendment protection for CRAs was
impregnable and widely accepted, the number of court decisions uphold-
ing the rule that CRAs benefited from First Amendment protection was
231. Id. at 265.
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small. An additional reason for the paucity of litigation against CRAs
prior to the shift to the issuer pays model in the 1970s was that investors
were not in privity with the CRA. Investors faced the fundamental obsta-
cle that they themselves did not subscribe to the ratings, and thus had no
contract with CRAs.
When CRAs shifted their business model and began to charge issuers
for ratings, and assigned their ratings in the interest of specific business
audiences (i.e., the investment banks that issued SF products, rather than
investors), U.S. courts increasingly came to regard their ratings and re-
ports as commercial speech. We argued that the once impenetrable shield
that CRAs enjoyed in U.S. court—thanks to the First Amendment—has
eroded since the subprime crisis of 2007–2008. Increasingly, courts came
to regard ratings as mere commercial speech that did not touch public
concerns—in contrast to the heightened constitutional protection for po-
litical free speech under the First Amendment.
Courts have pared back the quasi-immunity that CRAs previously en-
joyed from two different directions. Traditionally, courts considered rat-
ings to be free speech protected by the First Amendment. As a result of
several developments such as the shift from the “investor pays” to the
“issuer pays” model, the development of ancillary business, the issuance
of structured finance ratings, and the existence of growing conflicts of
interest, courts increasingly denied First Amendment protection to
CRAs. In addition, allegations of negligent misrepresentation and other
fraudulent behavior, as the SEC and the U.S. Senate established, pro-
vided investors with more grounds to sue CRAs and to reach advanta-
geous settlements. In 2015, after the U.S. Department of Justice sued
S&P, the firm settled claims that it inflated its SF ratings to preserve its
market shares and defraud investors for $1.375 billion.
Although recent cases and settlements support the view that Fitch,
Moody’s, and S&P failed as gatekeepers of financial markets, the new
liability regime that is emerging remains lenient. Besides, debt issuers are
still dependent on credit ratings, and finding simple and robust substitutes
to credit ratings is tricky. This suggests that law and regulation may be
unable to curb some deep-rooted market practices, even when such prac-
tices have had calamitous consequences for investors, taxpayers, and the
public. Without further reform and innovation, it is likely that CRAs will
again fail to act as gatekeepers in the lead-up to the next major financial
crisis.
